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ABSTRACT Because of the non-uniformity of the electric power CPS network and the dynamic nature of 
the risk propagation process, it is difficult to quantify the critical point of a cyber risk explosion. From the 
perspective of the dependency network, this paper proposes a method for quantitative evaluation of the risk 
propagation threshold of power CPS networks based on the percolation theory. First, the power CPS 
network is abstracted as a dual-layered network-directed unweighted graph according to topology 
correlation and coupling logic, and the asymmetrical balls-into-bins allocation method is used to establish a 
"one-to-many" and "partially coupled" non-uniform power CPS characterization model. Then, considering 
the directionality between the cyber layer and the physical layer link, the probability of percolation flow is 
introduced to establish the propagation dynamic equations for the internal coupling relationship of each 
layer. Finally, the risk propagation threshold is numerically quantified by defining the survival function of 
power CPS network nodes, and the validity of the proposed method is verified by the IEEE 30-bus system 
and 150-node Barabsi-Albert model. 
INDEX TERMS Electric power CPS, interdependent network, Percolation probability, Propagation 
dynamics 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the advancement of smart grid strategy, a large 
number of electrical equipment, data collection equipment 
and computing equipment are interconnected through two 
physical networks: the power grid and the cyber network. 
Traditional power systems with physical equipment as the 
core have gradually evolved into highly coupled Cyber 
Physical Systems [1]. A power CPS integrates the physical 
environment of the computing system, communication 
network and power system through 3C technology to form 
a multi-dimensional and heterogeneous complex network 
system with real-time perception, dynamic control, resource 
optimization, cyber fusion and interdependence [2], [3]. It 
is because of this dependency that the security of the cyber 
system can significantly affect the operation of the physical 
system. The risks in the cyber system space may also lead 
to power outages in the power grid [4]. 
In recent years, experts and scholars at home and abroad 
have studied and summarized the causes and laws of power 
accidents over the years, and they have found that when the 
failure rate of cyber system components exceeds a certain 
level, power system accidents occur [5]. The existence of 
cyber system risks such as attack behavior, security risks, 
and risk explosion may lead to the abnormal operation or 
failure of components, and such failures may propagate 
from a single component to the entire power grid. Due to 
the high degree of coupling in a cyber-physical system, 
even if the risk is small, once it propagates, the butterfly 
effect it generates may propagate over a wide range, which 
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will adversely affect the cyber system and the power grid. 
When the risk causes the loss of parts beyond a certain limit, 
it may even cause a large-scale blackout at a critical value.  
Therefore, determining the critical condition of security 
risks that can widely propagate in the power CPS network 
or the assessment of a security risk propagation threshold is 
of important theoretical and practical significance. The 
security risk propagation threshold has always been a 
primary concern in the study of complex network theory [6]. 
In a typical complex network, there are two main methods 
for assessing security risk thresholds of a power CPS 
network:  
1) One is the use of the dynamical equation of 
propagation based on the epidemiological propagation 
model [7], [8], wherein the SIS and SIR propagation 
models are the two most widely used classical propagation 
models [9], [10]. However, the use of this model requires 
the network under study to be a uniform single network, 
and the model has strict conditions for use and low 
universality. Although the actual power CPS network is a 
non-uniformly coupled network, the above method is no 
longer applicable. 
2) Another method is to set up a time-domain discrete 
differential equation group for transmission of power based 
on the reduction theory [11], [12] and establish a time-
domain discrete mathematical model for cyber flow using 
finite automata [13], [14]. In power CPS, there are essential 
differences in the transmission mechanism between power 
flow and cyber flow. It is difficult for this method to fully 
consider the characteristics of these two flows [15], and this 
method ignores the overall dynamics of the network. The 
analytical expressions are mostly implicit function 
expressions, and it is difficult to present the solving method.  
Based on existing research, this paper considers the 
directionality and coupling relationship of the link lines 
between the cyber network and the physical network in the 
power CPS network and establishes the power CPS 
network characterization model. Then, on this basis, this 
paper uses the theory of percolation flow to propose the risk 
propagation dynamic model of a power CPS network and 
provide a numerically quantitative evaluation of the model 
by defining the survival function of the power CPS network 
node. Finally, this paper illustrates the effectiveness of the 
method by practical examples. 
 
 
II. CHARACTERIZATION MODEL OF NON-UNIFORM 
POWER CPS NETWORK 
The quantitative assessment of the risk propagation threshold 
for power CPS networks first requires an effective and 
realistic network model. From the perspective of 
interdependent networks, there is an interdependence 
relationship between cyber networks and physical networks. 
That is, the cyber network is the “brain” and control system 
of the physical networks; the physical network provides 
energy for the cyber network [16], and they are 
interdependent and coupled into a two-tiered complex 
physical cyber fusion system. Most existing power CPS 
network modeling uses "one-to-one" coupling [17]; however, 
in an actual power system, a cyber node can only control one 
physical node, and one physical node can provide energy for 
multiple cyber nodes. In terms of the number of deployments 
and control methods, the number of cyber nodes is much 
larger than the number of physical nodes. Therefore, the 
dependency between the physical network and the cyber 
network node is "one-to-many" coupling. There are such 
nodes in the actual power system: it is highly autonomous 
and does not depend on the coupling network to be able to 
operate normally. Therefore, the "partial coupling" of nodes 
is more in line with the characteristics of the actual power 
CPS network.  
Because there are many differences in the connection 
modes and types of equipment for power CPS, to construct 
the characterization model of a non-uniform power CPS, the 
following definitions and assumptions are made based on 
complex network theory in this paper:  
1)  Taking the plant station level as the research unit, the 
cyber network (including the cyber systems and dispatch 
centers of each power station) and physical sites (including 
power plants, substations, and converter stations) are 
considered to be equivalent cyber nodes and physical nodes, 
respectively. 
2) The communication line between the cyber sites is 
equivalent to the edge of the cyber network. The 
transmission line between the physical sites is equivalent to 
the edge of the physical network.  
3) Considering the directionality and dependencies 
between the links of the physical network and the cyber 
network, the links between the layers are undirected edges, 
and the edges between different layers are directed edges. 
4)   Loops and multiple edges on the line are merged. 
Based on the above definitions and assumptions, the 
topology of the cyber network and the physical network is 
abstracted based on the complex network theory and 
expressed as two unweighted partial directed graphs Gc and 
Gp, where Gc represents the cyber network and Gp represents 
the physical network. 
A. PHYSICAL LAYER CHARACTERIZATION  
The physical layer model can be abstracted as a complex 
network unweighted graph, Gp=<Vp, Ep>, where Vp is the 
node (power plants, substations, and converter stations), Ep is 
the edge (transmission lines), Vp = {1,2,3...,Np} is the node 
set of the physical network, Ep ={Epij} is the set of 
connection edges of the physical network, and Ap=(apij) is the 
adjacency matrix of the physical network. Edges between 
physical layer nodes do not consider the direction, nor do 
they consider the capacity between the edges. In the coupling 
model, if a physical node fails, the cyber node that depends 
on its energy also fails. 
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B. CYBER LAYER CHARACTERIZATION 
The cyber network node is the control and processing center 
of the corresponding physical layer network node. In the 
cyber model, all relevant functions are considered to be 
completed in the abstract node. Similar to the physical layer 
model, the cyber layer model is abstracted as a complex 
network weightless graph, Gc=<Vc, Ec>, where Vc is the node 
(server, computing device, and data acquisition device), Ec is 
the edge (communication line), Vc={1,2,3...,Nc} is the node 
set of the cyber network, Ec={Ecij} is the set of connection 
edges of the cyber network, and Ac=(acij) is the adjacency 
matrix of the cyber network. Edges between cyber layer 
nodes also do not consider directions. In the coupling model, 
if a cyber node fails, the cyber node cannot communicate 
with its neighbor nodes. At the same time, because the 
invalid cyber node controls the corresponding physical node, 
its corresponding physical node also fails. 
C. CYBER-PHYSICAL COUPLING CHARACTERIZATION 
MODEL 
Through the above modeling method, an independent 
physical layer model and cyber layer model are obtained. 
Because there are "one-to-many" and "partially coupled" 
dependencies between the physical network and the cyber 
network, it is necessary to couple the two interdependent 
networks into a two-layer network model using an effective 
method. A large amount of data shows that the physical 
network and cyber network are in line with the characteristics 
of scale-free networks, and the degree distribution of nodes 
meets the power-law distribution characteristics. This paper 
builds a two-layer coupling network based on the asymmetric 
Balls-into-Bins distribution algorithm [18]: only one node in 
Gc supports linking to a node in Gp, and each node in Gp can 
link to multiple Gc nodes. 
The sizes of the physical network and the cyber 
network are denoted by |Gp| and |Gc|, respectively. To 
allocate links between the physical layer and the cyber 
layer nodes, it is assumed that the nodes in Gp are all bins, 
the nodes of Gc are balls, and |Gc| is independent and 
evenly put in |Gp|. The probability that each ball is 
assigned to the i-th bin is 1/|Gp|. For any 1≤i≤|Gp|, all balls 
are assigned to the i-th bin by lpi. |Gc| is independent and 
evenly put in |Gp|. The probability that each ball is 
assigned to the i-th bin is 1/|Gp|. For any 1≤i≤|Gp|, all balls 
are assigned to the i-th bin by lpi, 
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The Gc nodes supported by each node in Gp obey the 
binomial distribution B (|Gc|, 1/|Gp|). In this system model, 
the link from Gp to Gc is directional. If there are two edges 
from Gp to Gc, it indicates that there is interdependence 
between the two points in Gp and Gc. For the ith node in Gp, 
one link is randomly selected from its k links as a 
bidirectional link. This means that the Gp node supports the 
Gc node and the Gc node controls the i-th Gp node. For any 
1i|Gp|, 1j|Gc|, and defined event ij, the j node in Gc 
controls the i node of Gp. For any defined event j, select 
the j node in Gc as the operation center. When i,,j h,j= 
and ij, then:  
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Because each node in Gc has only one internal link and 
Gc is a scale-free network, the node degree distribution in 
Gc follows the Bernoulli distribution, and formula (2) is 
improved as: 
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=  = =            (3) 
It can be seen that the probability of two-way links in the 
network is |Gp|/|Gc|. Through the above method, the 
characterization model for a “one-to-many” partial coupling 
power CPS non-uniform network can be established, as 
shown in Fig. 1. 
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FIGURE 1.  Power CPS coupling model 
 
 
III. CONSTRUCTION OF RISK COMMUNICATION 
DYNAMICS MODEL BASED ON PERCOLATION 
PROBABILITY 
At present, there have been many simplifications for the 
network. It is believed that physical node failure causes the 
coupled cyber node to fail, and the failure of the cyber node 
will also cause the physical node to fail [19]. However, in a 
power cyber-physical system, important nodes (such as 
substations) widely use an uninterrupted power supply 
(such as UPS). Thus, node failure does not affect the 
normal operation of the power system for a short period of 
time [20]. Therefore, when considering the control and 
dependencies of the power CPS, when the cyber node fails, 
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the communication line may not be disconnected, and the 
physical node failure may not necessarily cause the cyber 
node to fail. For this reason, this paper considers the 
directionality and dependence of the coupling between the 
cyber network and the physical network. If node A is 
controlled by node B, node A will fail when node B fails; if 
node A is linked to node B, node A does not depend on node 
B. When node B fails, node A does not fail. Because the 
propagation of risk in the network is directional, 
hierarchical, and dynamic, when studying the risk 
propagation mechanism in the power CPS network, the risk 
propagation process can be equated to the deletion of nodes 
or edges in the coupling network. Here, we introduce the 
probability of percolation to simulate the failure probability 
of the nodes between the networks. The seepage probability 
is based on the analysis probability based on the various 
structures of the graph and its evolution process. It 
compares the risk propagation process to the process in 
which the points and edges in the network are infected with 
a certain probability. That is, failure of the cyber node leads 
to the failure of the physical node in the coupled network 
with a certain probability , which leads to the propagation 
of the next level of percolation. Taking Fig. 2 as an example 
to simulate the failure process of cyber network and 
physical network coupling. 
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FIGURE 2.  The process of interactive transmission between the cyber 
network and physical network 
 
1) In the initial stage, there are 4 power nodes and 10 
cyber nodes running in the coupling network. When node 
2 is attacked in the cyber network, the failure propagates 
in the network due to the coupling relationship between 
the networks, as shown in Fig. 2.  
2) In the largest connected subgraph in the cyber 
network, node 2 in the cyber network is linked to node 1 
in the physical network, and node 2 controls node 1. 
Therefore, when deleting cyber node 2, it is necessary to 
delete node 1 and the corresponding edges. Because node 
1 in the physical network supplies power to nodes 1 and 3 
in the cyber network at the same time, when the nodes in 
the physical network are deleted, nodes 1 and 3 in the 
cyber network must also be deleted, as shown in Fig. 2(b).  
3) Judging the maximum connected subgraph in the 
physical network, it can be known that when the physical 
network node 2 fails, the remaining nodes are valid 
according to the dependence of the network, which further 
causes the nodes 4, 5, and 7 of the cyber network to be 
disabled. The physical network and the cyber network 
failed node are deleted, and the result is shown in Figure 
2(c). 
4) By analogy, node 3 in the physical network is deleted, 
and node 6 and node 9 in the cyber network are deleted at 
the same time, as shown in Fig. 2(d).  
5) When the fault propagation stops, only node 8 and 
node 10 remain in the cyber network, and only node 4 in 
the physical network can still function normally.  
Based on the percolation theory below, by mapping the 
intentional attacks of cyber nodes into random attacks, the 
propagation dynamics equations are established for the 
internal coupling relations of each layer. In this process, the 
fault propagation begins with Gc, then affects Gp, then 
returns to Gc, and so on, repeating the above process until 
the system is stable. Before performing the percolation 
operation, it is assumed that a node will perform the 
percolation operation only if the following conditions are 
met:  
1) The node must be linked with a certain functional 
node, otherwise it is considered to be invalid, except for the 
autonomous node;  
2) The node must belong to the largest connected sub-
graph of its own network; otherwise, it is considered to be 
invalid.  
The communication process is shown in Fig. 3. The node 
randomly attacks a proportion of Gc networks. Then, the 
number of remaining functional nodes in the Gc network is 
Gc1'=Gc(1- )=1'Gc, and the number of nodes belonging 
to the largest connected subgraph in Gc1' is set to Gc1, Gc1= 
Gc1'F(1', c). Among them, 1' and 1 represent the 
remaining function nodes and the ratio of the largest 
connected group to all nodes, respectively. F(1', c) is the 
probability that a node belongs to the largest connected 
group and c is a power index. 
According to the percolation flow, the propagation 
dynamics equations for each stage are established as shown 
in Fig. 3. 
A. GC NETWORK CLUSTER STATUS 
First, a proportion  of nodes in Gc are randomly removed 
to start the risk propagation of the power CPS network. At 
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this stage, the Gc nodes in Gc are deleted and the internal 
links of these nodes are also deleted. When the link 
between nodes is deleted, Gc is decomposed into clusters. 
At this time, the remaining number of functional nodes in 
the Gc network is Gc1'. 
1 1| | | | (1 ) | |c c cG G G  =  − =                  (4) 
Because it is assumed that only the nodes contained in 
the largest connected subgraph can run, if this condition is 
not satisfied, some nodes and related edges are deleted. 
Here, we use Gc1 to represent the maximum connected 
subgraph after a Gc fault:  
1 1 1 1| | | | ( , ) | |c c c cG G F G   =  =                  (5) 
In the formula, 1' and 1 represent the remaining 
function nodes and the ratio of the largest connected group 
to all nodes. F(1', c) is the probability that a node belongs 
to the largest connected group, and c is a power index 
(same as below). 
 
Determine the starting node of the 
fault in Gc
Determine the proportion Φ of 
node failure 
Identify the largest Connectivity 
Subgraph Vc in Cyber Network 
Gc
Delete nodes in Gc that do not 
belong to Vc
Delete nodes in Gp that are not 
linked to Vc
Identify the largest Connected 
Subgraph Vp in Cyber Network 
Gp
Delete nodes in Gp that do not 
belong to Vp 
Delete nodes in Gp that are not 
linked to Vp
Traversing Topology 
Completed?
N
Y
Start
Initialization
Input coupling network topology 
data and coupling relationship
Output residual nodes in the 
network
End
 
FIGURE 3.  Flowchart of power CPS network penetration process 
 
B.  GP NETWORK CLUSTER STATUS 
In the first step, deleting the link between the nodes affects 
Gp. Because Gc loses the link, some nodes and links in Gp 
are also deleted. It is observed here that the links deleted in 
Phase 1 include unidirectional links and bidirectional links 
and now focus on bidirectional links because the nodes in 
Gp depend on them. According to formula (3), the 
probability that each node in Gp has a bidirectional link is 
|Gp|/|Gc|; therefore, the expected number of deleted 
bidirectional links is (|Gc |-|Gc1 |) ( |Gp |/|Gc|), which is also 
the number of nodes that must be deleted in Gp. Gp2' is used 
here to represent the remaining node set in Gp. There are 
still two-way links in the network: 
2 1
1 1
| |
| | | | (| | | |)
| |
( , ) | |
p
p p c c
c
c p
G
G G G G
G
F G  
 = − − 
 =  
                (6) 
2 1 1= ( , )cF                                      (7) 
The largest connected group of Gp2' is represented by Gp2. 
2 2 2
2 2
| | | | ( , )
| | ( , )
p p p
p p
G G F
G F
 
  
 = 
 =  
                          (8) 
2 2 2= ( , )pF                                     (9) 
C.  DYNAMIC RECURSIVE EQUATION OF COUPLED 
NETWORK RISK PROPAGATION 
Repeating the above process, the entire network will reach 
the final stable state, and a series of recursive equations can 
be used to represent the remaining components of the 
different stages of the network Gc and Gp, as shown in 
Table I. 
 
TABLE I 
RECURSIVE EQUATIONS OF THE REMAINING COMPONENTS OF GC AND GP AT 
DIFFERENT STAGES 
Time phase Cyber network Gc Physical network Gp 
Phase 1 
1'=  
1=1' F(1', c)  
Phase 2 
 2'=1' F(1', c) 
 2=2' F(2', p) 
Phase 3 
3'=2  
3=3' F(3', c)  
Phase 4 
 4'=1' F(3', c) 
 2=4' F(4', p) 
… … … 
Phase 2j 
 2j'=1' F(2j-1', c) 
 2j=2j' F(2j', p) 
Phase 2j+1 
2j'=2j  
2j+1=2j+1' F(2j+1', c)  
 
When the propagation behavior stops, the following 
equation is established:  
2 j 1 2 j 3 2 j 1
2 j 2 j 2 2 j 2
  
  
+ + −
+ −
  = =
   = =
                         (10) 
Because there are no more components in the largest 
connected subgraph in the two networks, here we order 
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x=2j+1'=2j+3'=2j-1', y=2j'=2j+2'=2j-2'. At this point, we 
can obtain 
( , )
( , )
p
c
x y F y
y y F x
 
 
=  

=  
                         (11) 
When 0x and y1 in both networks, the remaining ratio 
of the nodes in the final steady state can be calculated by 
lim ( , )
lim ( , )
2 j p
j
2 j 1 c
j
y F y
x F x
 
 
→
+
→
= 


= 
                   (12) 
At this point, a complete solution to the remaining 
components of Gc and Gp is obtained and the nontrivial 
solutions of x and y are solved. Then, the remaining number 
of nodes can be calculated. 
 
 
IV.  QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATION METHOD FOR 
SURVIVAL FUNCTION-BASED PROPAGATION 
THRESHOLD 
Through the analysis of the process of the risk propagation 
percolation, a series of recursive equations are obtained to 
solve the remaining components of the network. However, 
these recursive equations are implicit equations, and it is 
difficult to numerically quantify the risk propagation 
threshold of the network. This paper solves this problem by 
defining the survival function of the power CPS network 
node, the key part of which is the solution to 2j and 2j+1, 
which is also equivalent to solving the x and y in the 
implicit function (11). Table II shows the symbols used in 
this section: 
 
TABLE II 
SYMBOLS USED 
Symbols Description 
dp The degree of an internal node of network P 
dc The degree of an internal node of network C 
G0,p Node degree distribution function in P 
G0,c Node degree distribution function in C 
 
The power CPS network threshold evaluation process is 
shown in Fig. 4. 
First, we define the risk set of the power CPS coupling 
network Dcps=< Ncps, Ecps>, where Ncps is a set of network 
nodes that are at risk, Ecps is a set of directed edges. Ncps= 
{R, S}, and Ncps is described by the node risk value R and 
the node affected by the risk propagation factor S. R∈[0,1] 
and the value of S is represented by the probability that 
node Si fails. Risk sets can formally store and express the 
risk status of network nodes.  
Then, the degree distribution function of the power CPS 
network N is defined according to the distribution 
characteristics of degree-free network node degrees [21]: 
( ) ( )0,
0
k
n N
k
G u pr d k u

=
= =                     (13) 
The dN follows the internal node degree distribution 
function of the network N, and Pr(dN=k) represents the 
probability that a node has k internal links. Because the 
initially established network model is a scale-free network, 
the degree distribution of the network follows the power 
law distribution, that is, Pr(dN=k)=kk -, where k is a 
constant and the power law index varies with different 
network structures. 
Start
Method for constructing power CPS network propagation 
dynamics model based on link directivity
Power CPS Coupling Network 
Gc Network Cluster State Model
Power CPS Coupling Network 
Gp Network Cluster State Model
Constructing a Recursive Equation of Risk Propagation in 
Coupled CPS Networks
Power CPS Coupling Network 
Risk Set
Survival function of remaining 
nodes in power CPS network
Method for solving propagation 
threshold based on survival function
Determine the Gc network Gp network completely
The critical values of the solution are Φx and Φy
Φx  > Φy
Φcps = Φx Φcps = Φy 
Determine the power CPS system threshold
End
Y N
  
FIGURE 4.  Flowchart of power CPS network threshold evaluation 
process 
 
After removing the 1- proportional node from the 
power CPS coupling network N, the survival function of the 
remaining nodes is defined based on the risk set and the 
scale-free network degree distribution function and is 
represented by FN. 
,
,
( ) ( )
( )
N 0 N
0 N
F 1 G u
u 1 G u

 
= −

= − + 
                   (14) 
wherein, FN()1, for a single infinite scale-free network 
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N that has a power index, when 2<<3, FN(,)k· 1/(3-λ), 
and k is a constant.  
Assume that the node degree distribution functions of Gp 
and Gc are Pr(dp=k)=kak -p and Pr(dc=k)=kbk -c, 
respectively, where ka and kb are constants. Combining the 
equations, we can obtain a set of equations: 
,
,
,
,
( , )
( , )
( , ) ( )
( )
( , ) ( )
( )
p
c
p 0 p 1
1 1 p 1
c 0 c 2
2 1 c 2
x y F y
y y F x
F y 1 G u
u 1 y y G u
F x 1 G u
u 1 x x G u
 
 


=  
 =  

 = −
 = − + 

 = −

= − + 
                   (15) 
Suppose F(y, p)=k1y1/(3-p) and F(x, c)=k2y1/
（ 3-c), 
where k1 and k2 are constants determined by the Gp and Gc 
network structures, respectively. Equation (15) can be 
simplified as follows: 
1/(3 )
1
1/(3 )
2
p
c
x y k y
y k y




−
−
 =   

=  
                   (16) 
After eliminating y, we can obtain  
1 1 1 1
(1 ) 2 ( ) (1 ) ( )
3 3 3 3
1 2
p p p px k k x
   

+ + + 
− − − −
=                       (17) 
The right side of (17) can be reduced to Cx, where  
1 1
=(1+ ) ( )
3 3p p

 

− −
                     (18) 
When 2＜p, c＜3,  is far greater than 1. Here, we can 
see that (17) has a trivial solution x = 0, which shows that 
there is no node in the maximum connected sub-graph, that 
is, due to the risk of wide propagation in the network, the 
network is caused to completely collapse. Additionally, 
through computer simulation, it was found that when x>0 
and the removal ratio is greater than a certain value, the 
network starts to completely decompose. By setting y =x as 
the reference line, if the implicit function curve crosses the 
reference line, it means the implicit function has a solution. 
As shown in Fig. 5, when k1=2, c=p=2.5,=0.2, the 
curves converge at 0.635, which implies that under this 
network, the propagation threshold is 0.635, that is, when 
the removal ratio is greater than 0.635, the network is 
completely decoupled. 
Therefore, when the following formula is satisfied, the 
threshold occurs: 
1 1
(1 ) 2 ( )
3 3
1 2 1
p pk k c
 

+ +
− −
  =                    (19) 
Thus, the critical value for the solution of x is:  
1
12
3
31
1 2
p
p
x k k



+
−
−−=                             (20) 
Similarly, we calculate the critical point of y: 
1
11
3
31
2 1
c
c
y k k


+
−
−−=                            (21) 
 
FIGURE 5.  Effective solution of the curve 
 
The condition x, y[0,1] is satisfied, and the system 
threshold cps is the largest value in [x, y]. Therefore, (11) 
always has two solutions. 1) x=y=0, which is a simple 
solution. 2) The other depends on cps. If  >cps, the 
entire system will crash; otherwise, the system's largest 
connected sub-graph will continue to work. 
 
V.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF 
RESULTS 
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The proposed propagation dynamics model is used to 
simulate the seepage process of non-uniform power CPS 
networks. The physical layer of the power cyber physical 
system is the IEEE 30 node standard model. The cyber 
layer is a 150-node scale-free network based on the 
Barabasi-Albert model with parameters N=150, m=2, m0=3, 
and average degree <k>≈4. Asymmetric balls-into-bins 
allocation method is used between the two layers to 
establish a "one-to-many" coupling method. Based on this, 
a coupling model of 180-node power CPS constrained by 
various parameters is constructed. The coupling network 
has 30 power nodes, 107 communication nodes, 43 load 
nodes, 21 power lines, 125 information lines, and 84 
coupling branches. Part of the network structure is shown in 
Figure 6. The association relationship is performed by using 
the Pajek simulation software with flat visualization, as 
shown in Fig. 7. 
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FIGURE 6.  180 node power CPS coupled network structure 
 
 
FIGURE 7.  180 node power CPS coupling topology 
 
For the constructed 180-node power CPS "one-to-many" 
coupled network topology, the statistical topology degree 
distribution is shown in Table III. 
TABLE III 
DISTRIBUTION OF NETWORK NODE DEGREE 
Node degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 12 20 22 24 25 28 
Number of nodes 57 105 4 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
It can be seen from the table that most nodes in the 
network have degrees 1 and 2, and there are several nodes 
with large degrees in the network. Such nodes are important 
nodes in the network, and the nodes that are invalid or not 
functioning properly have a huge impact on the entire 
network. 
B. Example Analysis of The Evaluation Model 
Random attacks and deliberate attacks were carried out 
on the established models. The number of remaining nodes 
in the power CPS network that accounted for the proportion 
of all nodes in different attack modes was completely de-
listed from the entire network. 
 
1) EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF NETWORK NODE 
FAILURE RATE UNDER RANDOM ATTACK 
First, based on the constructed one-to-many coupling 
network topology of power CPS, the nodes in the cyber 
network are randomly removed, and the infiltration process 
in the entire coupled network is simulated by Java and 
Matlab to calculate the maximum connectivity in the 
network of each stage of seepage propagation. The number 
of subgraph nodes is the ratio of the original network nodes. 
As shown in Table IV, by continuously increasing the value 
of the removal ratio , it was found that when the  
increased to 0.39, the network began to de-column; when  
increased to 0.46, the maximum-connected sub-graph 
completely collapsed. 
 
TABLE IV 
THE VARIATION OF NODE FAILURE RATIO WITH Φ 
Removal ratio  0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 
Failure node ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.42 0.46 0.66 0.79 0.86 0.98 1 1 
 
Through the analysis of the results, it can be found that 
there is a critical point cps in the power CPS coupling 
network. When the removal ratio  is less than the critical 
point, the proportion of the maximum connected subgraph 
failed nodes does not change; when the removal ratio  is 
greater than this critical point, the proportion of the failed 
nodes of the largest connected subgraph gradually increases, 
eventually equaling 1. Therefore, there is a threshold for the 
number of attack nodes in the power CPS network. Above 
this threshold, the network structure undergoes a qualitative 
change, all nodes in the cyber layer and the physical layer 
fail, and the fault range is extended to all nodes. 
To further prove the above phenomenon and change the 
network parameter setting, let Gc=1000, Gp=10000, m=2, 
and m0=3. Then, construct the BA-BA coupling network 
and calculate the power index, respectively: c = p =2.2, c 
=2.2, p =2.33, c =2.2, p =2.5 in the three cases. The 
failure ratio of the Gc network and the 2j+1 phase of the Gp 
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network node changes with the removal ratio , where the 
values and simulation results are shown in Fig. 8. 
The analysis results show that with the disengagement of 
the Gc network, the coupled network Gp is also decomposed, 
and the double-layer networks are, respectively, disjointed 
at the same stage. This also shows that in a dependent 
network, when a network is attacked, the network coupled 
with it is also affected by the same strength. In addition, by 
analyzing the network decomposition process of the 2j 
phase and the 2j+1 phase, it can be found that when the 
failure rate of the single-layer network node exceeds the 
threshold, the entire coupling network is completely 
disjointed. 
 
FIGURE 8.  The variation of node failure ratio at each  
stage of  
 
In the case where the above three network parameters are 
unchanged, the change of the failure ratio of the entire 
coupled network node with the removal ratio  is further 
analyzed. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 9.  
Through single-layer network and coupled network 
simulation analysis, it can be concluded that because the 
nodes in the electric power CPS dependent network must 
rely on the nodes of other networks, when a network is 
attacked, the coupled network is also implicated, resulting 
in a cascading failure phenomenon. For different structures 
in the "one-to-many" coupled node network, there is still a 
network threshold phenomenon, and when the nodes of the 
same proportion are removed, the network failure ratios of 
different structures are also different. For networks with 
different structures, the network propagation thresholds are 
generally different. 
 
FIGURE 9.  The variation of node failure ratio with  
 
2)  EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF NETWORK NODE 
FAILURE RATE UNDER DELIBERATE ATTACK 
Similarly, a deliberate attack method was used for the 
above experiment to further analyze the threshold of the 
coupled network. It can be seen from Table III that there are 
22, 24, 25, and 28 nodes with large degrees in the network. 
When the four nodes are deliberately removed, the network 
is quickly disconnected, and the entire network is 
immediately paralyzed. When an attacker has a deep 
understanding of the network topology, a deliberate attack 
on an important node in the network will have a destructive 
effect on the coupled network. When deliberately removing 
a small degree node, the network unwinding speed is 
equivalent to that when randomly removing a node. At this 
time, the change of the proportion of the remaining nodes 
of the maximum connectivity subgraph with the removal 
ratio  is shown in Table V. When  increases to 0.35, the 
network begins to de-collapse; when  increases to 0.41, 
the largest Unicom sub-graph completely collapses. 
 
TABLE V 
THE VARIATION OF NODE FAILURE RATIO WITH Φ 
Removal ratio  0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 
Failure node ratio 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.53 0.62 0.77 0.84 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Using the same network parameters, let Gc =1000, Gp = 
10000, m = 2, and m0 = 3 and construct c = p = 2.2, c = 
2.2, p = 2.33, c = 2.2, p = 2.5 in the coupling scale-free 
network. In the deliberate attack mode, by deliberately 
removing the node of the f ratio, the coupling network 2j 
stage Gp network and 2j+1 stage Gp network node failure 
ratio changes with the removal ratio  value. The 
simulation results are shown in Fig. 10. On this basis, we 
analyze the change of the node failure ratio with the 
removal ratio devaluation of the entire coupled network 
under the deliberate attack mode. The result is shown in Fig. 
11. 
Through the analysis of the simulation results, it can be 
found that in the deliberate attack mode, as the removal 
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ratio increases slowly, the number of network failure nodes 
starts to increase slowly, but when fΦ increases to the 
network threshold, the coupling network is quickly 
decomposed, and the growth rate becomes increasingly fast. 
When the network node removal ratio is only 0.2, the 
network is basically completely flawed. When further 
deliberately attacking a large number of nodes in the 
network, the entire network is immediately in a state of 
collapse, and the damage of the entire network is much 
larger than that of the random attack, and the fault 
propagation is more serious. 
 
FIGURE 10.  The variation of node failure ratio at each stage of  
 
FIGURE 11.  The variation of node failure ratio with Φ 
 
 
3)  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NETWORK 
THRESHOLDS UNDER DIFFERENT COUPLING MODES 
Under the above network parameter constraints, the 
network risk propagation thresholds under the random 
attack and deliberate attack mode of a "one-to-one" coupled 
network and "one-to-many" coupled network are compared. 
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 12. 
The simulation results show that the model and method 
can effectively determine the risk propagation threshold of 
complex dependent networks. The network of different 
structures often has different propagation thresholds; 
compared to random attacks, the impact of deliberate 
attacks on the network is to a greater extent. Because the 
"one-to-one" coupling method oversimplifies the network 
structure, it is considered that when a node fails, the 
corresponding node also fails, and the directionality 
between the coupled network topologies is not considered, 
leading to a larger removal ratio. The network risk 
propagation threshold of the one-to-one coupling method is 
larger than that of the “one-to-many” network, and the 
network disjointing speed is too fast, whereas the “one-to-
many” network considers the directionality of the coupled 
network, which is closer to the actual network situation. 
The resulting threshold can better and more accurately 
reflect the security performance of the network. 
 
FIGURE 12.  Network threshold comparison under different coupling 
modes 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Based on the characteristics of power CPS in smart grids 
and the theory of interdependent networks, this paper takes 
into account the directionality and interdependence between 
the link between the physical network and the cyber 
network and proposes a characterization model for non-
uniform power CPS network. Based on this model, this 
paper uses the theory of percolation to establish the 
dynamic model of the coupling of a power CPS and then 
proposes the survival function of the node to quantitatively 
evaluate this model. Simulation experiments show that the 
proposed method can effectively estimate the risk 
propagation thresholds of non-uniform and partially 
coupled networks. The threshold level is related to the scale 
of the power CPS network and the network topology (the 
power exponent and coupling mode of the network), and 
the risk propagation thresholds of power CPS networks 
with different structures are also different. The results of 
coupling network attacks are compared with random attacks 
and deliberate attacks. It is found that the intentional attack 
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propagation behavior has a greater impact on the network. 
At the same time, the security risk propagation threshold 
can not only predict the critical point of risk explosion but 
also be used as a standard to measure network topology 
security. The greater the security risk propagation threshold 
of the network topology, the more difficult the risk spread is 
and the higher the security is of the network topology. 
According to the threshold constraint, the critical value of 
the security risk propagation burst of the power CPS can be 
defined, and the prediction of the security risk explosion 
under the complex system can be improved. 
By further combining a new generation of artificial 
intelligence technology to consider the hardware 
characteristics and grid constraints of power cyber-physical 
systems, and it is the next step of research to reveal the risk 
propagation mechanism of power CPS network from the 
essence of mathematics, improve the predictive ability of 
network security risk outbreak, and formulate 
corresponding defense strategy according to the 
propagation path analysis.  
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